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Abstract 
 
Loss aversion has become the dominant alternative to expected utility theory for 
modeling choice under uncertainty. The setting of the base payment in contracts provides 
an interesting application of referenced based decision theory. The impact of loss 
aversion on contract structure depends critically on whether reservation opportunities 
(outside options) are evaluated with respect to the reference point implied in the contract.  
We show that when reservation opportunities are independent of the reference point, 
reward contracts are optimal.  However, when reservation opportunities are evaluated 
against the reference point, then penalty contracts are more efficient. 
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In the standard contracting problem with hidden actions, a principal hires an agent to 
perform a task which affects the principal’s revenues.  Because revenue is stochastically 
related to the amount of effort exerted by the agent, and effort is costly to the agent, the 
optimal contract requires that the agent receives payments that are contingent on 
performance.  The specific structure of the pay for performance scheme, which can affect 
marginal incentives for effort, is dependent on the agent’s risk preference.  A well known 
result is that when agents are highly risk averse, the optimal contract involves making 
pay less dependent on performance as the agent’s cost of risk bearing will be high 
making it expensive for the principal to motivate the agent using variable pay.  When the 
agent is relatively risk tolerant, payment to the agent should be more variable to provide 
high powered incentives.1   
While contract theorists have focused much of their attention on the proper 
structure of marginal incentives for effort, it may be important to understand how a 
principal should determine the base pay, as well as when to use penalties versus rewards 
in structuring incentive schemes.   In practice, incentive contracts consist typically of a 
base level of pay, and some schedule of rewards and penalties based upon performance 
objectives.   For example, Hueth and Ligon  (2003) examine numerous supply contracts 
from the processing tomato industry and find that these contracts typically provide a base 
price for each ton of tomatoes, along with various penalties and bonuses that are 
contingent on various quality measures.    Horstmann, Mathewson, and Quigley (2002) 
report that contracts for life insurance sales agents contain bonuses for policy sales and 
renewals, and penalties for policy lapses.  Bonuses and penalties are also frequently 
                                               
1
 A similar result is obtained when the agent is risk neutral but faces a limited liability constraint (Innes, 
1990).  The main difference is that, instead of having to compensate the agent for risk bearing, the optimal 
contract would pay the agent limited liability rents in order to provide incentives.   
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observed in general sales agent commission contracts (Tallitsch and Moynihan, 1994).  
While these examples illustrate that pay for performance is clearly used in practice, just 
as standard agency theory predicts, the theory cannot explain why these contracts use 
rewards rather than penalties (or vice versa) and how base prices are determined.   
There is good reason for ignoring such topics. Standard contract theory employs 
expected utility theory, which assumes that there is a well defined level of utility 
associated with each possible level of wealth.  In this context, it matters little whether a 
high base pay is combined with penalties or a low base pay is combined with rewards so 
long as the amount of total pay is the same for each level of performance (Lazear 1998).  
For example, a piece rate scheme paying 5 cents per piece should, according to standard 
theory, produce the same effort level and profit levels as paying $20 for 400 minus a 
penalty of 5 cents for each piece under 400. In this example, the second contract simply 
draws attention to a specific performance level, without changing the incentive structure. 
Because expected utility cannot assign different levels of utility to a single level of 
wealth, it cannot differentiate between these two contract schemes.  In short, 
conventional theory suggests that bonuses and penalties are perfect substitutes.    
While conventional theory offers us no insights into how contract designers 
should establish the base pay, performance levels, and penalties and rewards, behavioral 
economic research might offer us clues.  For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
suggest that reference points can play a significant role in affecting people’s utility.  
Kahneman and Tversky assert that people not only care about their absolute wealth level, 
but are also concerned about how their wealth deviates from some reference level of 
wealth and may be more averse to losses (relative to the reference point) than gains of the 
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same size.  Under these assumptions, the setting of the base price can provide a reference 
point, while rewards and penalties represent deviations from the reference point.  In this 
case, penalties and rewards are no longer perfectly substitutable and the setting of the 
base price can interact with marginal incentives in a non-trivial way.     
In this paper we explore the theory of reference points and its implications for the 
determination of the base pay, and penalties and rewards in simple principal agent 
problems.  Our key assumption is that the agent is loss averse (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) rather than merely risk averse, so that an increase in wealth has less impact on 
utility than does an equal decrease in wealth, where increases and decreases are measured 
against some reference level of wealth.  This reference level of wealth is largely 
determined by the base pay in the contract so that losses and rewards are measured 
relative to the base pay.  Because the value function of the loss averse agent is typically 
concave above the reference point and convex below it, the careful design of the correct 
base pay can affect the marginal utility of wealth and will therefore have a non-trivial 
impact on risk (loss) premiums and incentives for effort.    
While choosing the right base pay can pin down the reference point and impact 
incentives under loss aversion, it is well known amongst prospect theorists that reference 
points are sensitive to context and framing.  We therefore examine two hypothetical cases 
that might be of relevance in contracting.   
In the first case, we assume that the agent evaluates all outcomes, including 
reservation opportunities (outside options), against the reference point (base pay) given in 
the contract.  If the agent makes such a comparison, then the optimal contract would be 
characterized by a high base price, along with penalties for poor performance.  The 
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intuition for this result is that, because the utility function is steeper over losses, the same 
pay for performance schedule can provide greater marginal incentives if it is designed to 
operate over the loss portion rather than the gain domain of the utility function.  
Moreover, a high base pay combined with punishments will push mean compensation 
below the base pay where the agent will be risk loving rather than risk averse.  Because 
the agent tends to be risk loving over losses, the standard tradeoff between risk and 
incentives is no longer true; instead, risk now complements incentives, enabling the 
principal to provide strong incentives even if the relationship between effort and 
performance is noisy.    
In the second case, we assume reservation independence so that the agent does 
not evaluate outside options against the reference point.  Instead, the reference point is 
used to evaluate outcomes within context so that reservation opportunities fall outside of 
the context of the contract.  In this case, outside opportunities are measured objectively 
(gains and losses are not exaggerated) and are not compared to the reference point in the 
contract.  In this scenario, the optimal contract provides the agent with a relatively low 
base pay combined with rewards, on average.  The intuition is that, because both rewards 
and losses within the context of the contract are exaggerated, rewards produce a utility 
level that exceeds the “objective” value (recall reservation utility is objectively assessed), 
whereas penalties would produce a utility level that is below the objective level.  Given 
this exaggeration, it is cheaper to provide incentives via rewards, as it would be very 
costly for the principal to use penalties to motivate effort while having to ensure that the 
contract yields ex ante utility (which is exaggerated downward) that exceeds the 
reservation utility (which is not exaggerated). 
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Contracting With Moral Hazard 
The standard principal agent model with moral hazard has become a workhorse model for 
describing many economic relations in insurance, labor markets, CEO compensation, 
organizational theory, sharecropping, and various other business related fields.  
A general formulation of the model (e.g. Holmstrom 1979) involves a principal 
who contracts with an agent to perform some task which affects the output (or revenue), 
[ , ]q q q∈ ⌢
⌣
, desired by principal.  The agent produces output by exerting some non-
observable and non-verifiable effort, e ξ∈ ⊆ ℝ , which is stochastically related to output 
via the cumulative distribution function ( | )H q e , which has a conditional density 
( | )h q e .  Exerting effort is costly for the agent in terms of disutility. The effort cost 
function is given by ( )z e , which satisfies the conditions ( ) 0,z e′ >  ( ) 0z e′′ ≥  with 
(0) 0z = .  The principal thus faces the problem  
(1) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( ),max |e w q V q w q h q e dq−∫ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
subject to  
(2) ( )( ) ( ) ( )|U w q h q e dq z e U− ≥∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
and 
(3) ( )( ) ( ) ( )arg max |e e
e
e U w q h q e dq z e∈ −∫
ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
where ( )V ⋅  is the principal’s utility function, and (w qɶ ) represents the contractually 
specified transfer from the principal to the agent, and ( )U ⋅  is the agent’s utility function.  
Rogerson (1985) has shown that if ( | )H q e  satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio 
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property (MLRP) and the convexity of the distribution function condition (CDFC), then 
the constraint (3) can be replaced by the agent’s first order condition: 
(4)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )| 0e eU w q h q e dq z e− =∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ   
The solution to the contract design problem is well known and is characterized by the 
following equation:  
(5)         ( )( )( )( )
( )
( )
' |
|'
e
V q w q h q e
h q eU w q
θ µ
−
= +
ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶɶ
, 
where µ  and θ  are non-negative multipliers.   This equation essentially describes the 
relationship between pay and performance.  Under MRLP, ( )( )
|
|
eh q e
h q e
ɶ
ɶ
 is increasing in qɶ  so 
that a high output sends a signal to the principal that the agent has exerted high effort.  In 
this case, the agent is rewarded with a high payment.  On the other hand, when output is 
low, the agent receives a low transfer.  The degree to which transfers vary with output 
will also depend on the relative curvatures of the utility functions of the respective 
parties.  For example, if the agent is extremely risk averse relative to the principal, then 
transfers will be less sensitive to output variation because it would be more efficient for 
the principal to bear more of the risk by reducing the variation in transfers.  
 From (5) we may derive many of the properties of the wage/quality relationship.  
While this contract is useful in discussing the risk sharing effects of contracts, and 
provides a rationale for pay for performance when moral hazard is present, it offers little 
guidance on practical matters such as how a base payment is to be determined, and 
whether premiums or deductions should be used in the pay for performance scheme. For 
example, most contracts specify some base pay, several deductions for poor performance, 
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and several premia for good performance. In the context above, the contract may look 
like  
(6) ( ) ( )w q w f q q= + −ɶ ɶ⌣ ⌣ , 
where f is a non-negative valued function, w⌣  is the lowest possible wage, and the 
support of qɶ  is given by ,q q  
⌢
⌣
. The standard theory suggests no specific reason to use a 
premium rather than a deduction, as the same utilities and payoffs can be achieved using 
either. For example, if the above contract were optimal and represented a premium paid 
for good performance, then we could define ( )w w f q q= + −⌢ ⌢⌣ ⌣ , and the contract  
(7) ( ) ( )( ) ( )w q w w w f q q w g q q = − − + − = − − ⌢ ⌢ ⌢ ⌢ɶ ɶ ɶ⌣ ⌣ , 
would yield the same payoff to both parties in all cases.  
Despite the fact that theory suggests no particular reason for the use of premia or 
deductions, there appears to be significant thought and gaming involved in choosing the 
base level of pay in real world contracts. Hueth and Ligon (2002) note that, while some 
processing tomato contracts contain special premia written in processor specific 
contracts, the boilerplate contracts used for all tomato farmers contain only deductions. 
Curtis and McCluskey (2003) find a mix of premia and deductions used in production of 
processing potatoes.  Thus, there may be some behavioral phenomena that impacts the 
structure of these contracts. Several behavioral models may lead to the use of specific 
base payments. The model that has had the greatest impact on the profession, and has 
been applied most ubiquitously, seems a good starting point for our analysis. We propose 
that loss aversion on the part of the agent may drive the structure of premia and 
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deductions, allowing the principal to obtain greater effort through manipulating the 
agent’s reference payoff. 
Loss aversion has become the preferred behavioral model to describe behavior 
dealing with risk. Kahneman and Tversky first proposed loss aversion as part of their 
prospect theory (1979). Loss aversion supposes that individuals experience diminishing 
marginal utility of gains in wealth, but also diminishing marginal pain from losses. Thus, 
a utility of wealth function must be contingent on a reference point, against which gains 
and losses are measured. Above this reference point, the utility function is concave, 
reflecting risk averse behavior. Below this reference point, individuals behave as if risk 
loving, willing to risk lower returns for a chance at returning to their reference point. 
There are many reasons why a principal may desire to manipulate the reference 
level of wealth for an agent. First, by doing so, he may manipulate the marginal utility of 
income, thus making his marginal incentive more effective. Secondly, Sandmo’s classic 
result (1971) suggests that risk attitude can affect input efficiency, and expected profit. 
Thus the principal may be able to enhance profits by manipulating the risk attitude of the 
agent via the reference payout level. 
We can write the loss averse value function as   
(8) ( ) ( )( )
if|
if
v x w x w
u x w
v x w x w
+
−

− >
= 
− ≤
 
where  ( ) ( )0 0 0v v+ −= = , so that utility is continuous, and ( ) ( )'' 0, '' 0v s v s+ −< > . Figure 
1 displays an example of what the referenced based utility function may look like. Note 
that the function is not differentiable at the reference point, and declines steeply when 
moving into the loss domain. The loss aversion paradigm has found support in many 
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contexts, including experimental (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Camerer, 1995) and 
non-experimental (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995) contexts, and even in contexts that do not 
involve risk (Kahneman Knetsch and Thaler, 1991).  
A common criticism of prospect theory is the problem of determining the 
reference point. In contracting, the base pay serves as a natural reference point.  
However, because context and framing are also important in prospect theory, an 
important consideration in contract design is how agents view reservation activities 
(outside options).  In standard contract theory, the reservation utility is typically treated 
as fixed and merely serves as a constraint on the principal’s contract design problem.   In 
prospect theory, the outside options may play a more important role depending on 
whether an agent evaluates these outside options against the reference point in the 
contract, or not.  We will illustrate the importance of this point in subsequent discussions 
by examining two cases - one where the agent compares outside options to the reference 
point and a second case where the agent does not make this comparison so that the 
reservation utility is independent of the reference point.   
Contracts and Reference Points 
If loss aversion is important in risky behavior, then principals should have a strong 
interest in manipulating reference points. In order to illustrate this principle, we propose 
the following model of agent behavior, based on the prospect theory value function 
(9) ( ) ( )| |U w w h q e dq e−∫ ɶ ɶ , 
where, as before, U  is a measure of utility of wealth, w , given a level of base pay, w .  
The disutility of effort is now assumed to be linear, which can be made without loss of 
generality.  We assume that ( )| 0wwU w w <  for w w> , ( )| 0wwU w w >  for w w< . 
 10 
Further, ( ) ( )lim | lim | 0
w w w w
U w w U w w
↑ ↓
= = , and ( ) ( )lim | lim |w w
w w w w
U w w U w w
↑ ↓
> , thus the 
function is continuous, but not differentiable at the reference level of wealth. Lastly, 
because we have assumed MRLP of ( | )h q eɶ , this implies that ( )| 0E q e
e
∂
>
∂
ɶ
, or that 
increasing effort increases output on average.  
 We will also assume that the principal is risk neutral and behaves rationally (in 
accordance with expected utility theory). The assumption of risk neutrality of the 
principal is frequently made in the literature and is justifiable if the principal is able to 
diversify its risks away (e.g. shareholders), or is a larger company that has resources to 
both diversify its operations and conduct sophisticated market analysis for decision 
support.  The agent, on the other hand, may represent a worker, a small supplier, a farmer 
or some other entity that has limited resources to diversify or access sophisticated 
decision support knowledge.  Thus, the agent’s behavior may be more heavily influenced 
by risk attitudes and behavioral anomalies.  
Following the contract theory literature, we suppose that the principal has all the 
ex ante bargaining power, and designs the contract to ensure that the agent obtains an 
expected payoff that, at minimum, covers his reservation utility.  However, because 
context and framing are important notions in the loss aversion literature, it matters 
whether the agent measures these reservation opportunities against the reference point in 
the contract or not.   In the next two subsections we outline the implications of comparing 
the reservation opportunity to the reference point (reservation in reference) or examining 
the reservation opportunity independent of the reference point (reservation 
independence).  
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Reservation in Reference 
If the agent evaluates his reservation activities in comparison to the reference point given 
in the contract, the principal must solve the following problem in designing the contract 
(10) 
( ){ } ( )( ) ( )* *, ,max |e w q w q w q h q e dq−∫ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
subject to  
(11) ( )( ) ( )* arg max | |
e
e U w q w h q e dq e∈ −∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
(12) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *| | |rU w q w h q e dq e U w w− ≥∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ . 
 
Here 
r
w  represents some reservation payoff that generates the reservation utility level.  
Also, note that the principal now must choose the optimal effort level, e* , the optimal 
contract, ( )( )*w q eɶ , as well as the base pay, ( )w w q= , which serves as the reference point.  
Because this is a particularly difficult problem to solve, we will first examine the optimal 
contract in the absence of uncertainty. In this case, the above model reduces to 
(13) 
( ){ } ( ) ( )( )( )* * *, ,maxe w q w q e w q e−ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
subject to  
(14) ( )( )( )* arg max |
e
e U w q e w e∈ −ɶ , 
(15) ( )( )( ) ( )*| |rU w q e w e U w w− ≥ɶ . 
 
Given that the agent has signed the contract, she will optimize by exerting effort e , 
where ( ) 1|w
q e
U w w
w q
=
ɶ
, if ( )q e q≠ . This leads us to our first proposition. 
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Proposition 1. Let U  be a prospect theoretic value function and suppose that for any ∆  
we can find lw w<  such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )| | | |l lU w w U w w U w w U w w− − ∆ > − − ∆  for any 
w w> . Then under the optimal contract without uncertainty, ( )( ) ( )*w q e w q=ɶ .  
Proof: Suppose that under the optimal contract ( )( ) ( )*w q e w q≥ɶ , with 
( )( ) 1|w
q e
U w w q
w q
=
ɶ
. Consider an alternative reference wealth a eq q ε= +ɶ ,  0ε > . 
Because, ( ) ( )lim | lim |w w
w w w w
U w w U w w
↑ ↓
> , the maximum of the first derivative occurs as 
one approaches the reference point from the left. Because ( )( ) 1lim |w a
w w
q e
U w w q
w q↑
>
ɶ
, and 
( )( ) 1lim |w a
w w
q e
U w w q
w q↓
>
ɶ
, the optimal level of effort for the agent must be larger under the 
new reference level of wealth, if ε  is small enough, and the optimal level of effort is not 
0. This latter possibility is excluded if 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )* *| | | |a r a rU w q e w q U w w q U w q e w U w w− > −ɶ ɶ .  
To understand proposition 1, note that the principal essentially must determine some 
optimal effort level e* which can be implemented with a contract payment of ( )( )*w q eɶ .  
The principal must also determine some optimal reference quality level, q , which will 
allow the principal to set some optimal base pay, w .   Proposition 1 essentially tells us 
that if the agent is loss averse, then the principal’s choice of e*
 
 also results in the optimal 
choice of the reference quality, q ,  and vice versa.  The intuition is that effort is 
monotonically increasing with the slope of the utility function. The slope is increasing to 
its maximum as the reference point is approached from the left.  The slope is decreasing 
 13 
from something less than its maximum as the reference point is approached from the 
right.   
Proposition 1 also implies that if the loss portion of the value function has less 
curvature than the gains portion, then the optimal payout will be the base pay. The 
constraint placed on the convexity of the loss function is a very minimal requirement that 
is met by all value functions currently used in the literature (see for example Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). This restriction simply requires that the pain from any loss be larger 
than the pleasure from an equivalent gain. This is of course one of the two main 
hypotheses behind loss aversion. Thus if agents are loss averse, the principal will 
optimize by stating the intended effort as resulting in exactly the base pay, this being the 
point with the greatest marginal utility of wealth. 
 Returning to the case of uncertainty given in (10) – (12), only complicates the 
picture mildly, with the result depending on the precision of the quality signal. To see 
this, note that if the conditional distribution of output satisfies MLRP and CDFC, then we 
can replace constraint (10) with the constraint:2 
(16) ( )( ) ( )| | 1 0eU w q w h q e dq − =∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ . 
Totally differentiating the agent’s first order condition with respect to e  and w  yields  
(17) 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
| |
| |
w e
ee
U w q w h q e dqde
dw U w q w h q e dq
 
 
= −
 
 
∫
∫
ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ
. 
                                               
2
 It is not difficult to prove that the first order approach is valid even with a loss averse utility function so 
long as MRLP and CDFC are satisfied. 
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Here, the expression in the denominator must be negative for the agent’s optimization to 
hold. Thus, maximizing effort with respect to w  must occur where 0de
dw
= .
3
 Note that 
altering the reference wealth exerts no cost to the principal, yet will result in increased 
mean profits, so long as the average wage remains constant. Thus, the principal should 
maximize effort over the reference level of pay.  
The denominator is just the agent’s second order condition, which must be 
negative. Thus, the optimal w  solves  
(18) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )*| | | | | 0w e rU w q w h q e dq U w q w h q e dq e U w w   − − =   ∫ ∫ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
the corresponding complementary slackness condition (because w  does not enter directly 
into the expected profit of the principal). The expression ( )( )|wU w q wɶ is always 
negative. Raising the reference point by some amount ∆  is exactly equivalent to 
lowering the wage by ∆ ; thus raising the reference point always lowers the value of any 
gamble.  
Proposition 2 Let U  be a prospect theoretic value function and suppose that for any ∆  
we can find lw w<  such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )| | | |l lU w w U w w U w w U w w− − ∆ > − − ∆  for any 
w w> , and that the conditional distribution of output be of the form 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )|h q e e h q e g e= −ɶ ɶ ,  satisfying MLRP, and CDFC, with ( )' 0g ⋅ > , ( )'' 0g ⋅ < . 
Then under the optimal contract, ( )*|E w e w≤  if ( )'' |U w w k<  for some k  and for any 
w w< . 
                                               
3
 Note that we assume that this function is concave.  If it were not so, then effort can be raised to infinity 
simply by changing the reference point (no change in pay scale would be needed).   
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Proof: First, the MLRP and CDFC constraints require that ( )' 0h ⋅ > . We can show that 
the IR constraint is relaxed by penalties. To see, this, note that for any w , 0
r
w w− > , the 
value ( ) ( )| |rU w w U w w−  is maximized where w w= . Thus, the constraint is least 
restrictive when the certainty equivalent is such that CE w= . Note, ( )*|CE E w e>  if 
( )*|E w e w<  by convexity, and ( )*|CE E w e<  if ( )*|E w e w≥  by concavity. The 
value function’s change in slope at w  means that the function will behave as if concave, 
satisfying Jensen’s inequality, if the value function is not too convex over losses. Thus, 
by the continuous nature of the CE , it can only equal w  if ( )*|E w e w< . Secondly, we 
can show that for any given wage schedule, effort increases as w  is increased from 
( )*|E w e . Totally differentiating the incentive compatibility constraint, we find 
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )
| | | ' '
0| | | |
w e w
ee ee
U w q w h q e dq U w q w h q g e g e dqde
dw U w q w h q e dq U w q w h q e dq
   
−   
= − = >
   
   
∫ ∫
∫ ∫
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
 
The denominator is the second order condition and must be negative, the integrand in the 
numerator must be negative. Thus, the optimal w  solves  
(19) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*| | | | | 0w e rU w q w h q e dq U w w h q e dq e U w w   − − =   ∫ ∫ɶ , 
the corresponding complementary slackness condition (because w  does not enter directly 
into the expected profit of the principal). Equation (19) can only be satisfied where the IR 
constraint binds.  Thus, the principal’s problem is solved where CE w= , implying that 
( )*|E w e w<   
Proposition 2 states the conditions under which we expect the average wage to be below 
the reference, or base pay, which can only be achieved if significant penalties are in place 
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in the contract.   There are two primary reasons that penalties should prevail. First, the 
utility function is steeper over the loss domain, meaning that a given pay for performance 
scheme can have a greater impact on marginal effort.  Second, as average wage is moved 
to the left of the reference point, the individual becomes more and more risk loving, 
increasing the certainty equivalent relative to average wage.  This means, that the 
standard tradeoff between risk and incentives becomes weakened so that the cost of 
providing incentives to the agent decreases significantly. This gives greater leverage to 
the principal in providing incentives even if the relationship between output and effort is 
very noisy.   
 Figure 2a and 2b illustrate how the principal can reduce average payout below the 
reservation wage and obtain the same level of effort. This is accomplished by raising the 
base level of pay, thus shifting the reference point to the right. When the reservation and 
reference level of pay are equal (Figure 2a) the function behaves as if concave, yielding 
utility below that obtained from the average wealth. When instead the reference point is 
shifted up (Figure 2b) the function behaves as if convex above the reservation wage, 
yielding a higher level of utility for the contract with the same level of expected pay. The 
irony of this result is that we used a model of loss aversion to show that losses are 
preferred to gains. As we will show in the subsequent section, this irony derives from 
how the reservation wage is compared to the base level of pay. Thus, any agent 
comparing reservation opportunities to the base level of pay, according to prospect 
theory, will actually behave ‘as if’ loss loving. The principal can take advantage of the 
risk loving portion of the utility function by inducing losses relative to the base pay.  
 
 17 
Reservation Independence 
Here we examine the case where the reference point is only used to evaluate outcomes 
within context – that is, only outcomes that would occur under the contract are compared 
to the reference point.  Outside options that affect the reservation utility are outside the 
context of the contract and are no longer evaluated against the reference point (base 
price).  Because reservation activities fall outside the context of the contract, they are 
now measured “objectively” (without exaggeration of gains or losses) with respect to the 
reference point. Figure 3 depicts the model we propose. Note that the reference based 
utility is measured in addition to an objective utility function.  In other words, outcomes 
that occur under the contract are mapped into a utility value in accordance with the utility 
function ( | ) ( )U w w u w+ , whereas outcomes that occur in alternative activities are 
mapped into a utility value determined by the function ( )u w .  We call ( )u w  “objective” 
because it does not magnify outcomes away from the reference point in the same way 
that ( | ) ( )U w w u w+  does.  Intuitively, an individual feels worse obtaining a $10 base bay 
and a $5 penalty than they do with an alternative that pays $5 always. The alternative that 
pays $5 always is not subject to the same framing. There is no sense that the individual 
did not do as well as they could have, and thus no added costs of loss aversion reflected 
in the individual’s evaluation of this alternative.  Figure 3 depicts that ( )| 0U w w =  for 
w  far enough above w . This condition is required for a solution to the principal agent 
problem. 
This model may seem contrary to the traditional loss aversion model proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979). However, one of the primary principles behind Kahnman 
and Tversky’s argument is that context matters when determining a reference point. One 
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could also suppose that the reservation utility is compared to some latent reference point 
not specified in the model.  Hence, despite its involved nature, this model does reflect the 
loss aversion phenomenon described in the literature. 
If the reservation utility level is independent of the reference wealth, we can 
rewrite the principal’s problem as  
(20) 
( ){ } ( )( ) ( )* *, ,max |e w q q q w q h q e dq−∫ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
subject to  
(21) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* arg max | |
e
e u w U w q w h q e dq e ∈ + − ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
(22) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* *| |u w U w q w h q e dq e U + − ≥ ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ , 
where ( )u w  measures the utility of wealth at the reference level of wealth. Here, it is 
anticipated that all outcomes that occur under the contract will be evaluated against the 
base pay whereas all outcomes that occur under an outside option will not be measured 
against the base pay.  Thus the reservation utility is measured without respect to a 
reference point.  This model is consistent with the notion that the individual anticipates 
that he will behave in a loss averse manner if he accepts the contract. The constraints in 
(21) and (22) can be rewritten as  
(21) ( )( ) ( )| | 1 0eU w q w h q e dq  − = ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
(22) ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *| |U w q w h q e dq U e u w  ≥ + − ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
The certainty equivalent (to the agent) of a contract is given by  
(23) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 * *| |CE u U w q w h q e dq u w e−  = + − ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ  
Differentiating with respect to w  yields 
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(24)
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 * *
* *
*
| |
' | | ' | | 1
1
' | | '
'
e
dCE
u U w q w h q e dq u w e
dw
deU w q w h q e dq u w U w q w h q e dq
dw
U w q w h q e dq u w
u CE
−  = + − 
    × − + + −     
 = − + 
∫
∫ ∫
∫
ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ ɶ
ɶ ɶ ɶ
 
This leads to our next proposition. 
Proposition 3 Let U  be a prospect theory value function, with 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* *' ' | | |u w U w q E w e h q e dq∞
−∞
 <
 ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ
 and ( )( )|h q e eɶ satisfy MLRP and CDFC. Then 
( )*|E w e w≥ . 
Proof: If 0dCE
dw
< ,  the individual rationality constraint can be relaxed by lowering the 
reference wealth w . Let ( )w q  be the solution to our problem. If the individual 
rationality constraint is binding on the agent’s problem when we set   ( )( )*|w E w q e= , 
then the optimal reference wealth has ( )*|E w e w≥ . This will occur if 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )* *' ' | | |u w U w q E w e h q e dq∞
−∞
 <
 ∫ ɶ ɶ ɶ
 .  
 Proposition 3 states that, with reservation independence where only gains and 
losses within context are exaggerated, the principal should, under most reasonable 
circumstances, offer rewards on average so that expected payoffs exceed the base price.   
Figure 4 illustrates that if the reference point is set equal to average pay, the certainty 
equivalent will be lower than the situation where the reference point is set below mean 
pay, where 1w  represents a base pay set at or above average pay, and 2w  represents a 
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base pay set below average pay. While both value functions are effectively concave 
around the mean level of pay, the value function with reference point below the mean 
( 2w ) is always above the value function with reference point at average pay ( 1w ). 
Because the individual exaggerates gains as well as losses, it will be cheaper for the 
principal to increase the agent’s within context utility by using rewards rather than 
punishments.  Rewards induce a utility that is above the “objective” reservation utility, 
whereas punishments would lower the agent’s utility relative to the reservation utility.  
Hence, it becomes much cheaper to induce participation in the contract by using a low 
base pay combined with rewards rather than a high base pay combined with punishments.   
As mentioned previously, for this model to have a finite solution, it must be the 
case that ( ) ( ) ( )|u w U w w u w+ ≤  for ˆw w> , for some wˆ w> . Without this condition, the 
further to the right of the reference point, the greater the utility. Thus, the principal could 
set the base pay at negative infinity, and obtain infinite effort. This restriction implies  
that the principal can only fool the agent to a certain extent, before the agent recognizes 
that a large bonus is offset by the severely low base pay.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
While the standard principal agent model sheds light on the shape of the optimal contract, 
it offers little guidance to contract designers on how to set the base pay, and does not 
distinguish between punishments and rewards in providing marginal incentives.  This 
paper extends the basic principal agent framework by incorporating behavioral 
considerations based on prospect theory, resulting in a model that can shed light on why 
it matters whether penalties are used instead of rewards and vice versa.  Under the 
assumption of loss aversion, the reference point or base payment of the contract can 
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affect the way agents evaluate gains and losses, which can in turn alter both their 
behavior and the way they evaluate contracts.   However, the way reference points affect 
incentives for effort and participation in the contract will also depend on context and 
framing.  When the agent compares all outcomes, including outcomes that would occur 
under outside options (options that affect the reservation utility), to the reference point, 
the principal can maximize profits by offering the agent a relatively high base payment 
combined with penalties, on average.  On the other hand, when only outcomes that occur 
under the contract are evaluated against the reference point, a low base pay combined 
with premia should prevail. 
Our results suggest that whether rewards or premia should be used in the optimal 
contract depends partly on the scope of influence of the reference point or base payment 
in the contract.  When opportunities beyond the contract are also assessed against the 
reference point, there is a strong rationale for the principal to exploit an agent’s loss 
aversion and use penalty contracts.  However, it is difficult to imagine that the scope of 
influence of the reference point in a contract will extend far beyond the contract.  It may 
be more reasonable to assume that the contractually specified reference point has its 
greatest impact on outcomes under the contract and its sphere of influence will gradually 
taper off as the agent evaluates opportunities outside the contract.  While there is little 
research that we are aware of to shed light on the scope of influence of reference points, it 
does appear from casual observation that very few contracts in practice induce average 
payments that fall below the base salary.  For example, many labor contracts include a 
starting salary and bonuses, and it is rare for average gross pay to fall below the base 
salary.  Managers and CEO’s are offered a base salary and then can earn additional 
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bonuses once performance targets are met.  In professional sports contracts, it is rare to 
observe negative incentives where a player has to return part of his base pay to the team 
if he fails to meet performance objectives.  Outside of labor markets, Hueth and Ligon 
(2003) analyze processing tomato contracts and find that these contracts typically include 
both premiums and deducts.  However, average compensation for a typical contract in 
1998 exceeds the base price by $1 per ton.  Curtis and McCluskey (2003) examine actual 
Russet Burbank potato contracts and outcomes for two Washington potato processors.  
While both deducts and premiums are observed in the contracts, the evidence shows that 
payoffs consistently exceed the base price for a truckload of potatoes.    
Possible avenues for future research include investigating the scope of influence 
of reference points.  For example, if an agent has both inside and outside options, does 
the reference point established for the inside option also effect the way agents evaluate 
outside options?  A clear answer to this question might complement the findings of this 
paper to shed light on which types of contracts may favor rewards or penalties.   
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Figure 2a. Loss aversion with reservation equal to reference wage. 
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Figure 2b. . Loss aversion with reservation below reference wage.  
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Figure 3. Loss aversion with reservation independence. 
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Figure 4. Certainty equivalents for reference points at the mean ( 1w , solid) and 
below mean ( 2w , dashed) pay under reservation independence. 
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